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In 1968 the union movement in higher education was launched on the CUNY 
campuses in New York when CUNY held the first academic labor union election on an 
“integrated, heterogeneous, multi-campus system” (Ladd and Lipset 1973).   In the nearly 
five decades since that historic election, unionization has grown to cover more than a 
third of all public four-year institutions and 40 percent of faculty at those public 
institutions (see Figure 1).   While unionization is more common at larger institutions, 
Figure 1 illustrates that even among the smallest public institutions, unionization has 
increased over time. 
Figure 1 here 
 
Yet, despite the benefit of time and the growing number of university faculty who have 
organized, there is arguably less consensus today over unionization’s impact on 
university effectiveness than there was in 1968.   Today, as then, faculty unions are under 
fire from legislators, the media, and the public (Davis 2011).  The repeated attacks have 
fueled reductions in state subsidies for higher education, curtailment or elimination of 
collective bargaining, establishment of so-called “charter” or “enterprise” universities 
(Martin and Samels 2005), and weakening or elimination of tenure (McPherson, M. and 
M.O. Schapiro. 1999).  This research cuts through the often-hyperbolic rhetoric to 
examine empirically the relationship between unionization and the performance of public 
universities.   
 There are, of course, multiple ways to assess university performance.  At the 
same time data limitations mean that, even if one could reach consensus on the perfect 
performance measure, it is unlikely that the perfect database would exist.  Studies of 
unionization in higher education typically focus on unions’ impact on individual 
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attributes such as compensation (Birnbaum 1974 & 1976; Brown and Courtenay 1977; 
Hendrick et al. 2011), working conditions (Wickens 2008), job security and job 
satisfaction (Ponak and Thompson 1984; Mayer 2011), decision-making and governance 
(Porter 2012) and academic freedom (DeCew 2003).   Relatively few studies look at the 
impact of unionization on the performance of institutions as a whole.  An exception is 
Kim Cameron’s 1982 article, “The Relationship between Faculty Unionism and 
Organizational Effectiveness.”    
Cameron’s study of 41 four-year institutions in the northeast concluded with two 
opposing possible relationships between unionization and organizational effectiveness.  
One possibility is that unionization reduces university effectiveness by centralizing the 
organization, imposing rigid personnel structures, and reducing the organization’s 
flexibility. Cameron (1982) writes, “When organizational energy is expended in 
rationalizing the organization through organizing and bargaining activities, less energy is 
available for the pursuit of multidimensional effectiveness or the satisfaction of multiple 
constituencies” (20).  At the same time, Cameron’s work also points to an opposing 
possibility:  far from reducing an organization’s effectiveness, unions are likely to occur 
in universities that have shown to be dysfunctional. Indeed, it is often an ineffective 
administration that prompts unionization.  As a result, Cameron acknowledges that 
unionism could be a “proactive move to improve organizational performance and 
institutional interaction” (21).  Because he had only cross-sectional data, Cameron was 
unable to determine which possibility was correct.  This research, at its core, takes up 
Cameron’s central question regarding unionization’s impact on institutional performance 
but this time with cross-sectional time series data from the National Center for Education 
3
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Statistic’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) spanning 23 years 
and 431 public four-year institutions
1
.  
 The paper is divided into four sections.  Methodology and data are presented in 
Section I.   Section II turns to the influence of unionization on higher education efficiency.   
Section III examines the influence of unionization on higher education effectiveness.  
Both empirical sections present and test several hypotheses derived from the scholarly 
literature. A concluding Section IV discusses a possible explanation for the research 
findings by examining the influence of unionization on a university’s budgetary priorities, 
i.e. the percent of the budget devoted to instruction vs. administration.   
 
I. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
   Scholarship on unionization and higher education typically uses cross-sectional 
data analysis.  However, since cross-sectional data offer only a snapshot in time, such 
approaches are unable to capture change in their models.  This research addresses the 
problem by using time series cross-sectional (TSCS) regression analysis to examine the 
effect of unionization on changes in university performance and behavior.  A panel data 
regression differs from a regular time-series or cross-section regression in that it has a 
double subscript on its variables: 
yit =αi + xit 'β +εit ,  i = 1, …, N; t = 1, …, T (1) 
 
The i subscript denotes the cross-section dimension (universities) and t denotes the time-
series dimension. Most of the panel data applications utilize a one-way error component 
model for the disturbances, with:  uit =αi +εit. 
                                                 
1
 The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) consists of nine interrelated survey 
components collected each year from all institutions that participate in any federal financial assistance 
program authorized by Title IV or the Higher Education Act of 1965. 
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TSCS data are characterized by repeated observations on the same fixed political 
units. In this case the units are 432 public four-year universities reporting data annually 
for 23 years.
2
  The two main options one has in TSCS is to analyze the impact of an 
independent variable on a dependent variable within a group, i.e. what happens to 
university performance when a university switches its union status?  This is known is as 
“Fixed Effects.”  Alternatively, one can use “Random Effect” which analyzes the impact 
of an independent variable across a group, i.e. what is the average effect of unionization 
on university performance?   
Random effects is used in this analysis for three reasons: 1) the core research 
questions center around unionization’s impact on university performance generally and 
not with respect to any specific university; 2) several variables in the analysis (University 
Selectivity and Carnegie Classification) do not vary over time and thus they would fall 
out of the analysis were we to use fixed effects; and third, the number of universities that 
switch union status during the time period is relatively small and thus making it difficult 
to analyze the impact of a switch in union status.  Using random effects allows us to 
determine the average effect of unionization across four-year public institutions not what 
would happen if a single university switched its union status. 
The data for this research come from the Delta Cost Project, a research 
organization that has developed a cross-state longitudinal database from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) data at the National Center for 
Educational Statistics.  The value added of the Delta Cost Project’s database is that it 
enables one to evaluate variables over time, and put information in context through 
                                                 
2
 Beck  (2001) notes that TSCS data are distinct from panel data, which are repeated cross-section data, but 
the units are sampled and they are typically observed only a few times. TSCS units are fixed; there is no 
sampling scheme for the units. 
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comparison with patterns in other states (Delta Cost Project 2013).   
  To maintain a narrow focus, I exclude vocational schools, medical schools and 
public 2-year institutions.  And, because of the Supreme Court’s NLRB v. Yeshiva 
University (1980) decision, private institutions are also excluded from the database
3
. The 
432public universities over 23 years generate approximately 9,461 observations.  
Variables used in the analysis are described in Appendix 1.  
  Dependent variables.   I explore the relationship between unionization and 
performance along two fronts that reflect different values.  The first value is efficiency.  
Are universities without unions more efficient than universities with unions?   Two 
different measures of university costs and expenses are used to capture efficiency.   The 
first measure is total spending on direct educational costs including spending on 
instruction, student services, and the education share of spending on central academic and 
administrative support, and operations and maintenance.  A second measure of efficiency 
is total education and general expenditures referred in IPEDS as “core expenses.”  The 
measure includes expenditures on instruction, research, public service, academic support, 
student services, institutional support, operations and maintenance, and scholarships and 
fellowships.    
I also measure university performance in terms of effectiveness: How well does 
the university fulfill its educational mission regardless of cost?  While no single measure 
can easily capture the mission of an institution, state legislators increasingly use 
                                                 
3
 The Supreme Court held that the implied exemption from National Labor Relations Act coverage for so-
called managerial employees applied to faculty members at Yeshiva, because their authority over 
University academic policy was nearly absolute. While it did not prohibit unionization at private 
institutions, the decision makes it extremely difficult for faculty in private institutions to bargain 
collectively. 
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outcomes such as completions and graduation rates as proxies for effectiveness.   Three 
outcome measures are used to capture effectiveness:  
Graduation rates. Proportion of full-time, first-time, degree/certificate-seeking 
undergraduate students graduating within 150 percent of normal time
4
;  
Degrees.  Number of degrees conferred per 100 full-time enrolled (FTEs) students 
by a college, university, or other postsecondary education institution as official 
recognition for the successful completion of a program of studies;  
Completions. The total number of completions (awards, certificates, and degrees) 
granted per 100 full time equivalent students enrolled.
 5
 
 
Independent variables. In addition to typically relying on cross-sectional 
analysis, studies of wages or costs in higher education often fail to control for cost-of-
living differences across states.  Were unionization rates equally distributed across the 
country, the variation in the cost of living would not bias the results.  But because 
unionization is positively correlated with living costs, for example, estimates of union 
impacts that omit this relationship overstate the impact of unionization (Hendrick et al. 
2011).   
A second limitation of earlier work is a lack of attention to state economic and 
political variables.  Studies that examine the influence of unionization on higher 
education do not typically control for a state’s economic or political context.  This is 
somewhat surprising since comparative state policy research routinely finds that the 
                                                 
4
 Normal Time to Completion - The amount of time necessary for a student to complete all requirements 
for a degree or certificate according to the institution's catalog. This is typically 4 years (8 semesters or 
trimesters, or 12 quarters, excluding summer terms) for a bachelor's degree in a standard term-based 
institution; 2 years (4 semesters or trimesters, or 6 quarters, excluding summer terms) for an associate's 
degree in a standard term-based institution; and the various scheduled times for certificate programs. 
5
 In IPEDs these data are reported by level (associate's, bachelor's, master's, doctor's, and first-
professional), as well as by length of program for some. Institutions report all degrees and other awards 
conferred during an entire academic year, from July 1 of one calendar year through June 30 of the 
following year. 
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political ideology of state policy makers and the economic health of the state influence 
the priorities of state government.   
Lack of attention to state institutional difference is also a limitation of past 
scholarship on higher education.  Knott and Payne (2004) develop a classification of 
higher education structures across states and show that such structures can influence the 
behavior of colleges and universities.  They find, for example, higher education 
institutions have more resources in those states in which statewide boards are more 
decentralized and have fewer regulatory powers.  Again, if unionization rates were 
distributed equally across states than institutional differences might not matter.  However, 
if unionization is concentrated in states that cede discretion over financial matters to 
colleges and universities, then ignoring this relationship may overstate the impact of 
unionization.  
I address the limitation of previous research by controlling for the following 
independent variables: 
Size of institution.  A categorical variable the divides student population into five 
quintiles coded 1-5 and labeled “very small”, “small”, “medium”, “large”, and 
“very large”.   The values vary over time because they reflect the relative 
population for any given year. 
 
Carnegie 2005 Classification. The 2005 Carnegie Classification includes all 
colleges and universities in the United States that are degree-granting and 
accredited by an agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education.  This 
variable does not vary over time. 
 
Selectivity.  Measured in terms of the number of students who apply divided by 
the number of students admitted. Admission and application information in the 
Delta Cost Project, does not cover all 23 years. I, therefore, use data for 2009 and 
assume that selectivity (like the Carnegie Classification) is relatively stable over 
time.  
 
Cost-of living adjustments. An annual cost of living index for the American states. 
(Source: William Berry http://mailer.fsu.edu/~wberry/garnet-wberry/a.html).  
8
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Unionization.  The Center for Collective Bargaining in Higher Education 
(CCBHE) collects the most comprehensive information on unionization among 
colleges and universities.  Using 2010 data provided by CCBHE I construct a 
dummy variable if any subgroup of faculty (full-time, part-time, or adjuncts) are 
represented by a union at the institution (1=union, 0=nonunion). 
 
Republican control over government.  A political measure created by merging 
data on the partisan character of each state government.  The variable is a 
variation on the Ranney index and measures the percentage of state institutions 
(assembly, senate, and executive) controlled by the Republican Party.  Thus if the 
Republican Party controls only one house of government the variable is .33, two 
houses is .66, and two houses plus the governorship is 1.  This variable varies 
over time.  
 
Economic context.  As an indicator of state economic performance, I use per 
capita state Gross Domestic Product from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the 
Department of Commerce.  The variable varies over time. 
 
Regulatory Structure. Knott and Payne’s measures of regulatory strength and 
centralization within higher education across states.  Knott and Payne classify   
each state into one of three categories: “highly regulated” (coded as a “3”) are 
states with governing or coordinating board and strong regulatory powers; 
“moderately regulated” (coded here as “2”) are states in which a coordinating 
board exists with some regulatory powers; and “minimally regulated” (coded as 
“1”) are states which have a coordinating board, advisory or planning agency with 
few formal regulatory powers.  
 
Partisan Structure.   Combines Republican Control and Regulatory Structure.  The 
impact of partisan control may be particular powerful when regulatory system is 
more centralized.  This interactive variable thus combines partisan control of state 
government with the Knott and Payne’s measure of regulatory strength.   
  
The next sections turn to the empirical analysis of unionization’s impact on university 
performance.   
II. UNIONIZATION’S IMPACT ON EFFICIENCY 
 
 
Policymakers and scholars disagree over the impact of unionization on 
organizational efficiency.  Some scholars argue that unionization weakens efficiency.  
Economists, for example, argue that by creating a cartel, unionized workers secure 
9
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artificially high wages that contribute to higher costs and lower efficiency (Marlow 2013;  
Vedder, Denhardt, and Robe 2012; see also Riley 2011). Political scientists and 
sociologists critical of unionization argue that public sector labor unions accrue unfair 
influence in the political process and use their power to shape elections in favor of 
policies that support unions at the expense of the public’s interest (Moe 2006).  Other 
scholars take an opposing view pointing out that internationally, countries with higher 
unionization rates enjoy higher productivity than those with lower unionization rates 
(Metcalf 2003).  Some economists suggest that by democratizing the labor force unions 
lead to more productive organizations in part because greater discretion is allocated to 
employees nearest to the client or customer (Addison 2005: Wolff 2012).  Finally, 
organizational scholars note that unions reduce turnover, reduce inequality within the 
organization, increase job satisfaction, and increase employees’ commitment to an 
organization’s mission; all factors linked to higher efficiency.  
Four Models of Efficiency.  To measure unionization’s impact on university 
efficiency I first model direct educational costs and core expense – two different 
measures of a university’s budget described earlier.  The two models use the following 
equation: 
   ( )                                                                         
                                          ( )                           
             (    )          
 
where Y is a measure of direct instructional costs or core expenses for public four-year 
institutions adjusted for inflation and the cost-of-living differences between states.  The 
log of both measures is used in order to pull outlying data from a positively skewed 
distribution closer to the bulk of the data, and to have the variable be normally distributed.   
10
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Since the budgets of one year are often used to set the following year’s budget, a one-
year lag of the dependent variable is included in the equation.   Dummy variables for 
each year are included to control for exogenous time factors.   
To assess unionization’s potential impact on changes in budgets, I also model the 
impact of unionization on the annual change in direct educational costs and core expenses. 
The two change models use the following equation: 
               ( )                                                         
                                                                                
             (    )          
   
where Y is annual percentage change ( [(Yn-Yn-1)/Y(n-1)] * 100 ) in the direct 
instructional costs or core expenses for public four-year institutions adjusted for inflation 
and the cost-of-living differences between states.  Because percentage change is affected 
by the size of the variable, I include the absolute value for direct educational cost and 
core expenses in the equation.  Year dummies are again included to control exogenous 
time-related factors.   
Hypotheses. Labor costs are the largest expense for any university.  If critics of 
unionization are correct, we would expect unionized institutions to be less efficient than 
institutions that are not unionized.  That is, all thing being equal, the budgets of unionized 
schools should be higher than non-unionized institutions. A second hypothesis is that 
given their emphasis on cost-cutting over revenue generation, one would expect schools 
in Republican-dominated state governments to have lower expenditures than school in 
states where Republicans are less dominant.  Also, one would expect wealthier states (as 
measured by per capita GDP) to have the flexibility and capacity to spend more on public 
universities than poorer states.  Third, one would expect the size of the institution and 
11
Cassell: The Impact of Unionization on University Performance: A Cross-sec
Published by The Keep, 2013
 12 
selectivity to be positively associated with school expenditures, i.e. the more selective a 
school and the larger a school the more costly it is likely to be.  Finally, Partisan 
Structure combines Knott and Payne’s institutional control variable with Republican 
control of state government. The expectation is that in states that are high centralized and 
highly Republican, one would expect greater cuts in higher education and lower core 
expenses.  
Table 1 here  
Results.   The results of the analysis across four models suggest that unionization 
is positively associated with efficiency. The results are presented in Table 1.  The union 
coefficients for the two budgetary variables are negative and statistically significant even 
after controlling for last year’s budget.  This means that a positive change in the union 
status of a university on average reduces a university’s direct educational costs and core 
expenses.  Similar results occur when examining the impact of unionization on the rate of 
change in direct instructional costs and core expenses.  Unionization, on average, 
contributes to a nearly one percent reduction in the growth of core expenses and 
educational costs.  
The relationship between the control variables and the dependent variables are 
largely as expected. The selectivity of an institution is statistically significant and 
negatively related to the two budget measures, i.e. as the institution becomes less 
selective (higher proportion of applicants are admitted) the cost and expenses of an 
institution decline.  At the same time, the relationship of selectivity to a change in costs 
and expenses is not statistically significant.  Size also matters.  Larger institutions are 
more costly and expensive than institutions with fewer students.   
12
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Political, economic, and administrative variables demonstrate mixed results. 
There is a negative and statistically significant relationship in three of four models 
between Republican control of government, suggesting that Republican-controlled state 
governments contribute to lower instructional cost and lower core expenses.  Per capita 
GDP is positively related and statistically significant in three of four models, suggesting 
support for the hypothesis that public universities in wealthier states spend more than 
schools in poorer states.  And finally in one of the models, “Partisan Structure” the 
interactive variable connecting Republican control with Knott and Payne’s institutional 
variable is positively related to budgets and statically significant.   
 
III.  UNIONIZATION’S IMPACT ON EFFECTIVENESS 
In addition to claiming that unions drive up costs and lower efficiency, critics of 
unionization argue that unions undermine effectiveness. Some economists argue that 
unions impose rigid hiring and promotion rules that limit an organization’s flexibility and 
keep unproductive employees in their jobs. Teachersunionexposed.com, one of a number 
of anti-union lobbying organizations, captures the view:  
America’s teachers unions — particularly the National Education Association and 
the American Federation of Teachers — are the most organized and powerful 
voices in education politics. These unions continue to block reforms needed to 
improve our nation’s schools by putting their focus on teachers rather than on the 
students they teach. 
 
An opposing view is also found in academic research.  Scholars note that unions improve 
working conditions, accountability, wages, and transparency – all factors linked to more 
effective organizational outcomes.  Indeed, it is precisely when reforms are needed that 
13
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unions help ensure that change will not be arbitrary or capricious.  Diane Ravitch, a 
senior fellow at the Brooking Institution, captures the view:   
The union is thus necessary as a protection for teachers against the arbitrary 
exercise of power by heavy-handed administrators. In our school systems, as in 
our city, state, and federal governments, we need checks and balances. Just as the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government all act as checks on 
each other, we need checks and balances in our school systems. 
http://www.aft.org/newspubs/periodicals/ae/winter0607/ravitch.cfm  
 
Thus, as with efficiency, scholars differ on the impact of unionization on effectiveness 
which, in turn, contributes to different expectations about the impact of unions in higher 
education. 
Three Models of Effectiveness.  As noted above, there are many ways to 
measure effectiveness.  Fortunately, the Delta Cost Project data include a complete set of 
commonly used outcome measures for the time period of this analysis.  To measure 
unionization’s impact on university effectiveness I select three different dependent 
variables: 1) graduation rate of students who finish within 150 percent of normal time; 2) 
# of degree award per 100 FTEs; and 3) # of completions per 100 FTEs.    The dependent 
variables are then modeled using the following equation:  
 ( )                                                                         
                                          ( )                                  
              (    )          
 
where Y is the outcome variable.   
Hypotheses.  If critics of unionization are correct one should expect universities 
with unions to perform worse than universities that do not have unions. That is, all things 
being equal, unionized schools should have lower graduation rates, degrees awarded, and 
completions.   One would also expect other control variables to influence educational 
outcomes.   One would expect more selective institutions to perform better than less 
14
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selective institutions.  One might expect wealthier states to generate more effective 
university outcomes.  At the same time, it’s less clear how the size of an institution, the 
partisan composition of state government, or the type of regulatory system might 
influence the effectiveness of public universities.  
Table 2 here 
Results.  The results are presented in Table 2.  The analysis finds little support for 
the view that unions hinder a university’s effectiveness. On the contrary, unionization is 
positively associated with graduate rates, degrees awarded and completions and the 
relationship is statistically significant.  Unionization, for example, leads to a nearly 1 
percent increase in the graduation rate of a school and is linked to an additional 
completion and degree for every 100 students.  High selectivity contributes to higher 
graduation rates and a greater number of degrees and completions.   Larger institutions 
are associated with slightly higher graduation rates but lower number of degrees and 
completions.  Wealthier states, measured in terms of per capita GDP, contribute to a 
larger number of degrees and completions, and better graduation rates.   The variable 
Partisan Structure which combines Republican*Regulatory Structure is negatively 
associated with degrees awarded and completions but positively associated with 
graduation rates.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION:  EMPHASIS ON INSTRUCTION OVER ADMINISTRATION 
The central findings of this research are provocative and run against the grain of 
some common expectations concerning the influence of unions on university budgets and 
performance.   The analysis finds that unions contribute to a more efficient and effective 
university.  Unionized institutions show lower costs and expenses even after controlling 
15
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for the previous year’s budget.  In addition, the rate of cost increases is lower in 
unionized institutions.  At the same time, unionization is positively linked to higher 
graduation rates, and a higher number of completions and degrees.   The results, while 
significant, raise more questions than they answer.  What contributes to these outcomes? 
What are unions doing that leads to lower costs and better performance?    
The Delta Cost Project dataset does not allow for a micro-level examination of 
how unions influence university policies.  Qualitative analysis may be needed to discern 
the organizational mechanisms at play at various institutions. However, two measures in 
the dataset offer a window into a possible answer.  One measure “Instruction share,” 
captures the share of education and related spending on instruction.  A second measure, 
“Administration share” captures the portion of spending on academic support, 
institutional support, and operations and maintenance ascribed to the education function.  
To the degree that budgets reflect priorities, the budgetary share for administration and 
instruction offer a snapshot over time of what the university believes is the appropriate 
balance between administration and instruction.  That balance may provide an answer to 
the puzzle posed by this research.  
Benjamin Ginsberg’s book The Fall of the Faculty: the Rise of the All-
Administrative University and Why It Matters (Oxford University Press, 2011) analyzes 
the sharp rise in administration at universities.  Between 1975 and 2005 the number of 
faculty grew by 51 percent while during that same time, administrators and 
administrative staffers grew 85 percent and 240 percent, respectively (p. 25).  The spike 
in administration affects university performance in two important ways: one, as the share 
16
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of administrators to faculty rises, university budget become bloated since administrators 
are typically paid well above the average faculty member.  Ginsberg notes:  
Administrative salaries are on the rise everywhere in the nation. By 2007, the 
median salary paid to the president of a doctoral degree-granting institution was 
$325,000. . . Somewhat more difficult to explain is the fact that by 2010, even 
some of the ubiquitous and largely interchangeable deanlets and deanlings earned 
six-figure salaries. (p. 25).   
 
In addition to higher costs, the administration-dominated university is characterized by 
poor performance partly because administrators often lack substantive expertise in areas 
in which they exercise control and partly because administrators rarely remain at the 
institution for more than five years.  Kent State University, for example, has had six 
Deans of Arts and Sciences since I arrived in 1996.  The current office holder is an 
interim dean, hired after the preceding interim dean took another job elsewhere.  
Ginsberg writes: 
College administrators are usually better at inventing or seizing control of 
activities than managing them effectively. When administrators take control of a 
program from the faculty they often ruin it, since they typically know far less 
about the program and less commitment to it than its original faculty directors.” 
(pp. 35-36). 
 
In short, Ginsberg’s research suggests one possible explanation for why costs and 
budgets might rise at a university while performance falters: the heavy mix of 
administration to faculty.  The question is whether unionization, a variable Ginsberg does 
not include in his analysis, plays a role in shaping the balance between administration and 
instruction on campus.  To address the question I use two models built around a similar 
set of control variables used in earlier analyses:   
 ( )                                                                         
                                          ( )                                  
              (    )          
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where Y is the percentage of the education-related spending devoted to: 1) instruction 
and 2) administration.   
 The central hypothesis is that unionized institutions faculty play a more central 
role in managing the university.  Indeed, much of what is negotiated in a collective 
bargaining agreement centers on issues of governance.  Thus, in unionized institutions I 
expect a higher percentage of the education-related budget to be devoted to instruction 
than in non-unionized institutions.  Relatedly, in unionized institutions I expect a lower 
percentage of the education-related budget to be devoted to administration than in non-
unionized institutions. 
Table 3 here 
Results.  The analysis in Table 3 reveals that unionization has a statistically significant 
impact on the budgetary mix between administration and instruction.   Unionization leads 
universities to emphasize instruction over administration.   The budgetary share of 
administration declines by .5 percent with unionization.  At the same time, unionization 
leads to a one percent increase in the instructional share of the budget.  One can see the 
relationship graphically in Figures X and Y.   
Figure 2 Here 
Figure 2 compares the mean share of administration between unionized and non-
unionized schools over time for all four-year public institutions. The graph illustrates that 
at no point have unionized institutions devoted more of their budget to administration 
than non-unionized institutions.  Moreover, the difference is typically two to three 
percent; a sizeable amount given that university budgets can often exceed $500 million.   
Figure 3 Here 
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Figure 3 compares the mean share of instruction between unionized and non-
unionized schools over time for all four-year public institutions.  The graph illustrates 
that the overall share of resources devoted to instruction as declined over time.  At the 
same time, unionized schools consistently devote a much higher proportion of their 
budget to instruction than non-unionized schools. And again, the difference can be as 
high as four percent.  Were one to break out the comparisons of administration and 
instruction by the size of school it is likely that differences between union and non-union 
institutions would be even greater for the medium and larger institutions. 
In sum, this research began with one puzzle and ended with another.  The paper 
began with the question Kim Cameron posed nearly 25 years ago: What impact does 
unionization have on university performance?   The empirical analysis included several 
measures of university performance that reflected values of efficiency and effectiveness.  
Based on the experience of 432 public four-year institutions over 23 years, I find that 
unionization improves efficiency and effectiveness.  Unionization contributes to lower 
budgets, higher graduation rates, and a greater number of degrees and completions.  
These finding prompted the further question: How is it possible to have a less costly 
institution with better outcomes?  
There are likely to be numerous ways in which unions affect the costs and quality 
of a university.  Most of the linkages, however, require more in-depth qualitative studies. 
The Delta Cost Project Data, however, included information on the budgetary mix of 
administration and instruction.  Drawing on the work of Benjamin Ginsberg and others I 
considered what role if any unionization plays in influencing the share of university 
resources that are devoted to administration and instruction.  Not surprisingly, 
19
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unionization is positively related to a higher percentage of the budget devoted to 
instruction and lower percentage to administration.  What makes this finding particularly 
interesting is that it suggests union influence on university performance may be indirect 
as well as direct.  In other words unions may influence how universities perform by 
influencing the university’s priorities regarding instruction and administration. 
20
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Table 1:  Unionization’s Impact on Higher Education Budgets 
 
 Variables 
Log of 
university 
instructional 
costs 
Annual rate 
of change in 
university 
instructional 
costs   
 
Log of core 
expenses 
Annual rate 
of change in 
core 
expenses 
Union -0.00798*** -0.9774*** -0.00566*** -0.7746*** 
Selectivity of Institution -0.0178*** -0.0347 -0.0162*** 0.063 
Size of Institution 0.0111*** -0.1647 0.0103*** -0.2295* 
Republican Control of State Gov. -0.0206*** -2.7930** -0.0027 -0.8706* 
Knott and Payne Structural Controls -0.0017 -0.2560 -0.000078 -0.0159 
State GDP Per Capita 7.44e-07*** 0.000064* 1.06e-06*** 0.00008*** 
Carnegie 2005 -0.00085 -0.0821039 -0.00053 -0.0548 
Lagged Dependent Variable 
0.9851*** 
 
 
0.9831*** 
 
 
Original Budget Variable 
 
 
1.08e-09* 
 
 
1.43e-09* 
Partisan Structure 0.0048* 0.5665141 0.000064 0.0821 
Year dummy variables 1-23     
Constant 0. .2816*** 3.8328 0.2915*** 1.9532 
Groups 432 432 432 432 
Observations 9461 9461 9461 9461 
Within R
2
 0.9790                          0.1017                          0.9857                          0.0945                          
Between R
2
 0.9998                                         0.0220                             0.9998                             0.0243                                         
Overall R
2
 0.9963 0.0989 0.9969                                         0.0914                                         
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 2: Unionization’s Impact on Higher Education Outcomes 
 
 Variables 
Degrees per 
100 FTEs 
  
Completion 
per 100 FTEs 
 
Graduation 
Rate  
Union 0.5472** 0.6987*** 0.0158* 
Selectivity of Institution -3.3217** -3.2207** -0.1694*** 
Size of Institution -0.3780*** -0.3492*** 0.0101*** 
Republican Control of State Gov. 1.4408*** 1.3520*** -0.0366*** 
Knott and Payne Structural Controls 0.0372 0.0668 -0.0083 
State GDP Per Capita 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 4.25e-06*** 
Carnegie 2005 -0.8258*** -0.7889*** -0.0126*** 
Partisan Structure -0.4013*** -0.3706*** 0.0129*** 
Constant 23.2487*** 22.9711*** 0.4332*** 
Groups 432 432 429 
Observations 9892 9892 3396 
Within R
2
 0.1075                          0.1799                          0.0376                          
Between R
2
 0.1812                                         0.2084                                         0.1774                            
Overall R
2
 0.1617                                         0.2003                                         0.1667                            
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Table 3: Share of educational budgets spent on administration 
and instruction 
 
 Variables 
 
Administration 
Share of 
Educational 
Costs  
 
  Instructional 
Share of 
Educational 
Costs 
Union -0.0047* 0.00976*** 
Selectivity of Institution -0.1058*** 0.0952*** 
Size of Institution -0.0086*** 0.0106*** 
Republican Control of State Gov. -0.0037 0.00036 
Knott and Payne Structural 
Controls 
-0.0012 0.0004 
State GDP Per Capita -1.10e-07 -6.89e-08 
Carnegie 2005 0.0120*** -0.0162*** 
Partisan Structure 0.00341*** -0.00429*** 
Year 1-23   
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Constant 0.4234*** 0.4897*** 
Groups 432 432 
Observations 9894 9894 
Within R
2
 0.0223                          0.0751                          
Between R
2
 0.3335                                         0.3611                                
Overall R
2
 0.2799                                         0.3198                                
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Appendix 1 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Description and Source 
Core Expenses 11847 1.78e+08 3.19e+08 Total education and general 
expenditures includes all core operating 
expenditures, including sponsored 
research, but excluding auxiliary 
enterprises. This variable was 
originally reported in IPEDS, but for 
recent years it is calculated by 
summing expenditures on instruction, 
research, public service, academic 
support, student services, institutional 
support, operations and maintenance, 
and scholarships and fellowships.  
Source: Delta Cost Project 
University 
Instructional Costs 
11939 1.08e+08 1.77e+08 Total education and general 
expenditures includes all core operating 
expenditures, including sponsored 
research, but excluding auxiliary 
enterprises. This variable was 
originally reported in IPEDS, but for 
recent years it is calculated by 
summing expenditures on instruction, 
research, public service, academic 
support, student services, institutional 
support, operations and maintenance, 
and scholarships and fellowships.  
Source: Delta Cost Project 
Administration Share 11814   0.3473522 0.0847561    The share of education and related 
spending on other education and 
related costs (the portion of spending 
on academic support, institutional 
support, and operations and 
maintenance ascribed to the education 
function). 
Source: Delta Cost Project 
Instructional Share 11806    0.5581084     0.0984689    The share of education and related 
spending on instruction. 
Source: Delta Cost Project 
Total degrees per 
100fte 
11922 22.28943 12.324 The total number of degrees granted per 
100 full time equivalent students enrolled. 
Source: Delta Cost Project 
Total Completions 
per 100fte 
11925 23.39101 24.08849 The total number of completions (awards, 
certificates, and degrees) granted per 100 
full time equivalent students enrolled. 
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Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Description and Source 
Source: Delta Cost Project 
Graduation Rate 3734 0.4663928 0.1615311 Percentage  of full-time, first-time, 
degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate 
students graduating within 150 percent of 
normal time. Normal Time to Completion - 
The amount of time necessary for a student 
to complete all requirements for a degree 
or certificate according to the institution's 
catalog. This is typically 4 years (8 
semesters or trimesters, or 12 quarters, 
excluding summer terms) for a bachelor's 
degree in a standard term-based institution; 
2 years (4 semesters or trimesters, or 6 
quarters, excluding summer terms) for an 
associate's degree in a standard term-based 
institution; and the various scheduled times 
for certificate programs.  
Source: Delta Cost Project 
Unionized 12038 0.3267154 0.4690317 National Center for the Study of 
Collective Bargaining in Higher 
Education and the Professions , 
http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/ncscbhep 
State Control 12038 0.427268 0.3397763 Vanderbilt University, State Politics 
and Judiciary Code Book 1987-2005, 
The Council of State Governments, 
Book of States 2005-2009 
Selectivity 9945 0.6669668 0.176803 Total admission/Total Applications. 
Sources: Delta Cost Project 
Carnegie 2005 11841 18.71556   3.55856          The 2005 Carnegie Classification 
includes all colleges and universities in 
the United States that are degree-
granting and accredited by an agency 
recognized by the U.S. Secretary of 
Education. The 2005edition classifies 
institutions based on their degree-
granting activities from the fall of 2003 
through the spring of 2004.          
1 = Associate's--Public Rural-serving 
Small; 2 = Associate's--Public Rural-
serving Medium; 3 = Associate's--
Public Rural-serving Large; 4 = 
Associate's--Public Suburban-serving 
Single Campus; 5 = Associate's--Public 
Suburban-serving Multicampus; 6 = 
Associate's--Public Urban-serving 
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Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Description and Source 
Single Campus; 7 = Associate's--Public 
Urban-serving Multicampus; 8 = 
Associate's--Public Special Use; 9 = 
Associate's--Private Not-for-profit; 10 
= Associate's--Private For-profit; 11 = 
Associate's--Public 2-year colleges 
under 4-year universities 
12 = Associate's--Public 4-year 
Primarily Associate's; 13 = Associate's-
-Private Not-for-profit 4-year Primarily 
Associate's; 14 = Associate's--Private 
For-profit 4-year Primarily Associate's; 
15 = Research Universities (very high 
research activity); 16 = Research 
Universities (high research activity); 17 
= Doctoral/Research Universities: 
Doctorate-granting Universities.; 18 = 
Master's Colleges and Universities 
(larger programs); 19 = Master's 
Colleges and Universities (medium 
programs); 20 = Master's Colleges and 
Universities (smaller programs); 21 = 
Baccalaureate Colleges--Arts & 
Sciences; 22 = Baccalaureate Colleges-
-Diverse Fields; 23 = 
Baccalaureate/Associate's Colleges; 24 
= Special Focus Institutions--
Theological seminaries, Bible colleges, 
and other faith-related institutions; 25 = 
Special Focus Institutions--Medical 
schools and medical centers; 26 = 
Special Focus Institutions--Other 
health professions schools; 27 = 
Special Focus Institutions--Schools of 
engineering; 28 = Special Focus 
Institutions--Other technology-related 
schools; 29 = Special Focus 
Institutions--Schools of business and 
management; 30 = Special Focus 
Institutions--Schools of art, music, and 
design; 31 = Special Focus Institutions-
-Schools of law; 32 = Special Focus 
Institutions--Other special-focus 
institutions ; 33 = Tribal Colleges; 0 = 
30
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 8 [2013], Art. 4
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss8/4
 31 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Description and Source 
Not classified; -3 = Not applicable, not 
in Carnegie universe (not accredited or 
nondegree-granting) 
Source: Delta Cost Project 
Size 12038         3.010052     1.419309           Categorical variable. Divides annual 
FTE data in to five quintiles. 
Source: Delta Cost Project 
Knott and Payne 12038  2.672371    1.138561           Categorial variable that measures the 
degree of centralization in state 
regulatory system for higher education. 
Sources: Knott and Payne  
Cost-of-Living 
Adjustment 
12038  78.17978     17.34694    William Berry,  
http://mailer.fsu.edu/~wberry/garnet-
wberry/a.html 
State GDP Per Capita 12038   33372.37     8702.626       Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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